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TINKER-ING WITH MACHINE LEARNING:
THE LEGALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ONLINE SURVEILLANCE OF STUDENTS
Amy B. Cyphert
All across the nation, high schools and middle schools are quietly entering
into contracts with software companies to monitor the online activity of their students, attempting to predict the next school shooter or to intervene with a student
who might be contemplating suicide. Systems using algorithms powered by machine learning trawl the Facebook posts of fifteen–year–olds and weed through
the Twitter feeds of seventeen–year–olds. When certain keywords or features are
flagged, the posts are forwarded to school administrators, who can decide
whether the post requires an intervention and whether the student requires discipline. Who (or what) decides what these keywords are? What protections are given to the massive amounts of student data these third parties are collecting? Do
parents and students even realize such online surveillance is happening?
Too often, the answers to these questions are unclear. This Article explores
the legal and policy questions related to this new era of surveillance, which is
fueled by machine learning. Although this technology is relatively new to schools,
it has been used for decades now in the criminal justice system, which has embraced sentencing algorithms and predictive policing. As is true with so many
things in the criminal justice system, there is evidence that these technologies
have had a disproportionate impact on people of color. In much the same way,
evidence is emerging that the online monitoring of students is having a disproportionate impact on students of color. Despite having an aura of neutrality, at
each stage in the machine learning process, there is a possibility for bias to creep
in.
The legality of schools entering into contracts for third-party surveillance of
their students is uncertain, as courts have not ruled on it specifically and have
just begun to rule on the legality of schools regulating student internet speech at
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all. The fact that every state has a cyberbullying law that arguably requires
schools to police their students’ online speech complicates the legality question.
This Article explores what legal challenges to third-party surveillance under the
First and Fourth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause might look like,
and the likelihood of success of those arguments. Because the legal challenges
are hypothetical at best, and perhaps years away, the Article concludes with
some policy recommendations aimed at ensuring safety and fairness for all students.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, a seventeen–year–old named Mishka,1 angry that his friends had
recently been jumped in a fight, penned a Facebook post full of violence, including saying that his high school was “asking for a [expletive] shooting, or
something.”2 Friends saw the post and alerted school officials, who contacted
the police.3 By the time psychologist Dr. John Van Dreal, who ran the Safety
and Risk Management Program for Mishka’s Oregon public school system, arrived, Mishka was in handcuffs.4 Mishka and his classmates were lucky: their
school system employed a risk management program, and Dr. Van Dreal was
able to help talk with Mishka about what caused him to write the post.5 Realizing that Mishka had no intention of harming anyone, Dr. Van Dreal helped
Mishka avoid being charged with a criminal offense.6 Dr. Van Dreal also arranged for him to attend a smaller school, where he found mentors, graduated
on time, and is today a twenty–five–year–old working for a security firm.7
Had Mishka’s story happened today, just eight short years later, it might
have looked very different. First, instead of his friends noticing his troubled Facebook post and alerting his school, it might have been flagged by a machine
learning algorithm developed by a software company that Mishka’s school paid
tens of thousands of dollars to per year. Although Mishka’s post was clearly
alarming and made obvious mention of possible violence, a post flagged by the
algorithm might be seemingly innocuous and yet still contain terms or features
that the algorithm had determined are statistically correlated with a higher likelihood of violence. An alert would be sent to school officials, though the algorithm would not necessarily explain what features about the post triggered it.8
Dr. Van Dreal and the risk management program? They might have been cut in
order to pay for the third-party monitoring conducted by the software company.9 A school official would be left to decide whether Mishka’s post warranted
some form of school discipline, or even a referral to the authorities.10
1

Rhitu Chatterjee & Rebecca Davis, When Teens Threaten Violence, A Community Responds
with
Compassion,
NPR
(Feb.
13,
2019,
7:30
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/13/693136117/when-teens-threatenviolence-a-community-responds-with-compassion [https://perma.cc/QF69-PURS]. NPR did
not provide Mishka’s full name, in order to protect his privacy. Id.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Edward C. Baig, Can Artificial Intelligence Prevent the Next Parkland Shooting?,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
14,
2019,
2:30
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/02/13/preventing-next-parkland-artificialintelligence-may-help/2801369002/ [https://perma.cc/UTS7-Y23A].
9 Schools across the nation are facing budget shortfalls. Amanda Litvinov & Mary Ellen
Flannery, The High Cost of Education Budget Cuts, NEA TODAY (July 16, 2018),
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Predictive machine learning algorithms are currently being used to monitor
the online activity of school students across the country.11 These algorithms are
familiar to many defense attorneys and criminal justice advocates, as the same
technology underlies predictive policing and sentencing algorithms.12 In the
criminal justice system, these technological advances have come with alarming
stories of bias against certain marginalized groups. What role should these algorithms have in schools monitoring their students? What are the implications,
both legally and practically, of such a surveillance scheme?
Part I of this Article defines machine learning, attempting to go beyond the
“black box” metaphor and to break down and explore the discrete stages of machine learning. At each stage, there is potential for bias, despite the sticky notion that algorithmic decision-making is somehow more objective and unbiased
than that of humans. Examples of bias in predictive algorithms in the criminal
justice system are examined, specifically sentencing algorithms and predictive
policing. When the ACLU and others decried the use of these algorithms in the
criminal justice sector, software companies shifted their focus to schools, and
Part I also explores how surprisingly widespread the practice of schools using
third parties to conduct online surveillance of their students has become.
Because the practice of using a third-party company’s algorithm to monitor
school students is still a relatively new practice, the legality of it is unclear at
this point. Accordingly, Part II examines various legal challenges that impacted
students might bring. All fifty states now have cyberbullying laws, some of
which seemingly require that schools monitor their students’ online activities,
which complicates legal challenges.13 Section II.B lays out two distinct First
Amendment challenges that can be made. Section II.B lays out two distinct
First Amendment challenges that can be made. First, disciplined students can
challenge their suspensions or other discipline for their online speech a la the
seminal Tinker case. Second, students can challenge the very act of hiring a
third party to monitor student speech as a prior restraint. Section II.C lays out
Fourth Amendment arguments, which would be premised under the theory that
students have a privacy interest in their online speech. Finally, Section II.D
looks at why disciplined students who argue they were unfairly targeted for
discipline because of their race or other status are unlikely to succeed on an
equal protection claim.
http://neatoday.org/2018/07/16/the-high-cost-of-education-budget-cuts
[https://perma.cc/8JTC-9BKJ] (“In 2015, [twenty-nine] states provided less school funding
than in 2008. Since state funding fuels nearly half of the nation’s K–12 spending, these cuts
have huge implications.”).
10 See Baig, supra note 8 (describing one product that uses machine learning to scan students’ social media posts, and then alerts school administrators, parents and possibly law
enforcement officials to potential problems).
11 See infra Section I.C.
12 See infra Section I.B.
13 Is Cyberbullying Illegal in Your State?, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/speaks/is-cy
berbullying-illegal-in-your-state [https://perma.cc/93CJ-ZNWF] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
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It is probably unlikely that any court will rule that schools are fully foreclosed from hiring a third party to monitor their students’ online activity, notwithstanding serious potential legal problems with that practice. Thus, Part III
makes a series of policy recommendations to help guide schools and policymakers as they move through this unchartered terrain. The first recommendation is to invest in high-quality counselors, a proven way to address both selfharm and violence against other students in schools. Second, schools need to
work with students and their parents to be transparent about the kinds of monitoring they are engaging in, and to invite feedback and input. Finally, the programmers who are developing these monitoring algorithms need to be sure to
form teams that are multidisciplinary in order to produce the least-biased products, and thus the least-biased results.
I.

MACHINE LEARNING AND BIAS

When many lawyers think of “artificial intelligence,” they conjure up images of Orwellian robots or Bladerunner. Artificial intelligence is actually a
sub-field of computer science, one that focuses on how to train computers to do
“intelligent” tasks that have traditionally been done by humans.14 The commands that programmers use to get computers to accomplish these tasks are algorithms.15 At the most basic level, an algorithm is simply a series of commands that will solve a problem or accomplish a goal.16 In that sense, a recipe
is an algorithm, as is a step-by-step set of driving directions. When most people
use the term algorithm, they are referring to computer codes and to algorithms
that are a series of commands telling a computer what to do.17
A. Defining Machine Learning
Machine learning is an umbrella term to describe a special subset of algorithms wherein a computer is programmed to revise the code it is using as it
works, based on the results it is generating.18 Frequently in machine learning,
the algorithm works to identify patterns in the data it is examining, develop cer14

Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2014).
See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017); Surden, supra note 14, at
89.
16 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 671.
17 Paul Ford, What is Code?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 11, 2015), https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-paul-ford-what-is-code [https://perma.cc/7K3U-MF3T] (noting that most people say “algorithm” when they actually mean “code” or “software”).
18 Surden, supra note 14, at 89. For a comprehensive exploration of the various stages of
machine learning, see Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 655 (concluding that there are eight
“key” steps to machine learning: (1) Problem Definition, (2) Data Collection, (3) Data
Cleaning, (4) Summary Statistics Review, (5) Data Partitioning, (6) Model Selection, (7)
Model Training, and (8) Model Deployment). Part I of this Article discusses certain steps in
the production of a machine learning algorithm and how bias is possible in each. See infra
Section I.D.
15
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tain rules from those patterns (or “learns” from them), and then uses those rules
to categorize the next set of data it looks at.19 Most of us are familiar with
common examples of machine learning, even if we do not recognize them as
such. For example, the spam filter on your email is an example of machine
learning.20 It has been programmed to pay attention to the characteristics of
emails you commonly delete—details such as keywords in the subject line or
the identity of a sender—and to learn over time which you mark as spam and to
adjust accordingly.21 Machine learning is simply programming a computer to
incorporate results into the next round of whatever you’ve asked it to do, with
an aim toward making each round better.22 Put another way, “[m]achine
[l]earning focuses on the question of how to get computers to program themselves (from experience plus some initial structure).”23
Scholars have begun in recent years to examine the various ways that algorithms and machine learning can be inadvertent tools for deepening inequality.
The argument is not that the algorithms themselves have been intentionally
coded to disadvantage certain groups, such as an algorithm that automatically
awards poorer credit scores to applicants who are black or disabled. Rather, the
concern is that algorithms “can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination,
inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the widespread
biases that persist in society,” even when “they have not been manually programmed to do so.”24

19

Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms Used
in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915, 920 (2018) (“Machine learning occurs when a
computer identifies patterns from a preexisting or training set of data, learns from those patterns, and incorporates the lessons into the algorithm.”).
20 Surden, supra note 14, at 90.
21 See id. at 89–90 (defining machine learning as “a subfield of computer science concerned
with computer programs that are able to learn from experience and thus improve their performance over time,” and explaining that spam filters are a common example of this technology).
22 See Chris Meserole, What is Machine Learning?, BROOKINGS: REPORT (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-machine-learning [https://perma.cc/A46M-NDF
9] (describing the process of building an algorithm to detect human faces and concluding
“[t]he magic of deep learning is that the algorithm learns to do all this on its own. The only
thing a researcher does is feed the algorithm a bunch of images and specify a few key parameters, like how many layers to use and how many neurons should be in each layer, and
the algorithm does the rest. At each pass through the data, the algorithm makes an educated
guess about what type of information each neuron should look for, and then updates each
guess based on how well it works.”).
23 Tom M. Mitchell, The Discipline of Machine Learning, in MACHINE LEARNING
TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (2006), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~tom/pubs/MachineLearning.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/8DFG-KWNX].
24 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671,
674 (2016).
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For example, facial recognition software is notoriously bad at correctly
identifying the faces of people of color.25 When an MIT researcher examined
three apps that purport to identify gender based on photographs, she found “that
darker-skinned females are the most misclassified group (with error rates of up
to 34.7%)” while “[t]he maximum error rate for lighter-skinned males is
0.8%.”26 Google had to apologize in 2015 when its image-recognition photo
software—“Google Photos”—labeled photos of black people as “gorillas.”27
The negative impacts of bias in facial recognition software extend beyond embarrassing corporate gaffes. This software can be used for purposes ranging
from identifying criminal subjects from security video footage to identifying
melanoma from an image.28 That the software has such racially inconsistent
outcomes has very serious implications and has led the ACLU to decry its use
in policing and its “potentially devastating outcomes.”29 The President of Microsoft even took the extraordinary step of publishing a blog post urging governments to regulate the technology—technology that his company makes—
because “certain uses of facial recognition technology increase the risk of decisions, outcomes and experiences that are biased and even in violation of discrimination laws.”30
Why does facial recognition software have so much trouble with non-white
faces? The answer is complicated and contested. One reason may be that so
many software engineers and coders are themselves white men, and as they
build the algorithms that underlie facial recognition software, “they focus on

25

Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-int
elligence.html [https://perma.cc/79WA-QS9Q].
26 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1 (2018).
27 Conor Dougherty, Google Photos Mistakenly Labels Black People ‘Gorillas’, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2015, 7:01 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/google-photos-mistake
nly-labels-black-people-gorillas [https://perma.cc/R3X3-VYCU].
28 Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 26, at 1–2; see also Dhruv Khullar, A.I. Could Worsen
Health Disparities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/o
pinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html [https://perma.cc/78SE-JR27] (listing the variety of ways artificial intelligence is now used as a diagnostic tool in medicine and pointing out the risks of
bias: “A recent study found that some facial recognition programs incorrectly classify less
than [one] percent of light-skinned men but more than one-third of dark-skinned women.
What happens when we rely on such algorithms to diagnose melanoma on light versus dark
skin?”).
29 Natasha Singer, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Wrongly Identifies 28 Lawmakers,
A.C.L.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/techno
logy/amazon-aclu-facial-recognition-congress.html [https://perma.cc/LEW6-A55D].
30 Brad Smith, Facial Recognition: It’s Time for Action, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON THE
ISSUES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/12/06/facial-re
cognition-its-time-for-action [https://perma.cc/FV7V-YYEE] (“We believe it’s important for
governments in 2019 to start adopting laws to regulate this technology.”).
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facial features that may be more visible in one race, but not another.”31 Programmers, like most of us, will tend to focus on what they know and to extrapolate from their own experiences.32 That initial programming bias is then further reinforced through machine learning.33 The training data sets that data
scientists use to teach the model how to recognize faces disproportionately feature white faces,34 as the majority of image data sets in use now have a Western, Eurocentric focus.35 Put another way, “[t]he code ‘learns’ by looking at
more white people—which doesn’t help it improve with a diverse array of races.”36 These issues—a lack of diversity in programmers, a lack of diversity in a
training dataset, and others—can lead to serious bias problems in systems that
use machine learning. That bias, and the results of it, are especially dangerous
when machine learning systems are used in the criminal justice system.
B. Use in Criminal Justice System
The use of artificial intelligence and especially machine learning has been
embraced in important ways by the criminal justice system, with results that
have at times been disturbingly disproportionate for people of color. It is important to ground our analysis of online monitoring of students with the ways
that machine learning technology has been used in the criminal justice system
for three important reasons. First, the historical trend is that criminal justice tactics frequently creep down into school discipline, in a sort of reversion of the
traditional school-to-prison pipeline, a phenomenon discussed below in Section
I.C. Second, the software companies that created this technology and marketed
it to police departments and probation officers have expanded their scope and
now market it to school districts.37 Third, because federal courts have not yet
ruled on the constitutionality of schools outsourcing online monitoring of their
31

Ali Breland, How White Engineers Built Racist Code–and Why it’s Dangerous for Black
People, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/04/
racist-facial-recognition-white-coders-black-people-police [https://perma.cc/UY43-5PNE].
32 Id.
33 See Paul Teich, Artificial Intelligence Can Reinforce Bias, Cloud Giants Announce Tools
for AI Fairness, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulteich/2018/09/
24/artificial-intelligence-can-reinforce-bias-cloud-giants-announce-tools-for-ai-fairness
[https://perma.cc/8STB-HWSK] (citing to a white paper cautioning that machine learning
can exacerbate bias in a data training set, given the repeated cycles used in machine learning,
which can “[create] a vicious cycle.”).
34 Id.; see also Breland, supra note 31. Training data sets are explained more fully infra Section I.D.2.
35 Shreya Shankar et al., No Classification Without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity
Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World, GOOGLE RES. 2–3 (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.08536.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WX7-ECLF] (concluding that in one
open image data set with more than 9 million images, 60 percent of the images came from
North America and Europe, with only 3 percent combined from China and India, the two
most populous countries in the world).
36 Breland, supra note 31.
37
See infra Section I.C.

20 NEV. L.J. 457

Spring 2020]

TINKER-ING WITH MACHINE LEARNING

465

students to third parties, it is helpful to examine the corollary of how courts
have responded to challenges from defendants when probation departments or
police departments have embraced predictive technologies.38 Accordingly, as
we attempt to predict the outcomes of the expanded use of algorithms to monitor students, the use of algorithms in the criminal justice system offers important insights.
1. Sentencing Algorithms
A judge’s determination of a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism—how
likely the judge believes it to be that the defendant will commit a future
crime—is an important factor in determining that defendant’s sentence, especially any carceral sentence.39 If a judge believes it is less likely that the defendant will reoffend, she is more likely to issue a non-carceral sentence or a
shorter carceral sentence.40 The federal sentencing guidelines bake in a view on
recidivism by including a defendant’s criminal history in the recommended
sentence calculation: under the guidelines, those who have offended before are
viewed as more likely to offend again, and therefore require a lengthier sentence to deter them and protect the public.41 Some scholars argue that the increase in judicial discretion brought forward by decisions such as United States
v. Booker, which made the sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, has led to a greater judicial and legislative reliance on recidivism prediction
instruments.42
Although scholars have been debating the use of predictive algorithms in
criminal sentencing for several decades now,43 much of the public at large
38

See infra Section I.B.
See, e.g., United States v. Gayle, 389 F.3d 406, 409–10 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a defendant’s criminal history category, one of two important calculations made under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, “serves as a proxy for his likelihood of recidivism.”).
40 Sara Chodosh, Courts Use Algorithms to Help Determine Sentencing, but Random People
Get the Same Results, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/g00/recidiv
ism-algorithm-random-bias [https://perma.cc/YRK5-6T52] (“A person who’s unlikely to
commit another crime is less of a threat to society, so a judge will generally give them a
shorter sentence.”).
41 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). These guidelines are structured to account for both the offense
level and the criminal history background. Id. § 5A cmt. n.1. Thus, the higher the criminal
history background, the longer the possible sentence. See id. § 5A.
42 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809–11 (2014) (tracing the use of recidivism prediction tools from the earliest use and noting an acceleration post-United States v. Booker, and
noting “[t]ight sentencing guidelines leave little room to consider the defendant’s individual
risk, but in discretionary systems, judges are expected to assess it.”).
43 See Robert García, “Garbage in, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1049, 1142–43 (1991) (discussing back in
1991 the “promise but also [] the threat of computers in the criminal justice system,” and
urging defense counsel to “aggressively seek discovery concerning computerized information from the government, including access to the underlying information, programs,
39

20 NEV. L.J. 457

466

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

learned about them through an explosive ProPublica report in May 2016.44
People who were arrested in Broward County, Florida were assigned a “risk
assessment score” from an algorithm created by software company Northpointe.45 The county paid about $22,000 a month for Northpointe’s software—
called COMPAS (“Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions”)—in the hopes that it would help judges and probation officers
more accurately predict the likelihood of recidivism for criminal defendants
and “to help identify which defendants were low risk enough to be released on
bail pending trial.”46 The ProPublica reporters examined the risk scores of
7,000 people arrested in 2013 and 2014 and compared those scores to the actual
rates of recidivism.47 Black defendants were 77% more likely to be labeled as
“at higher risk of committing a future violent crime” than white defendants,48
despite the fact that “race” was not one of the fields that COMPAS included in
producing its risk scores.49
Despite the proliferation of stories like the ProPublica one,50 proponents of
sentencing algorithms claim that they are somehow less biased than judges or
juries. Indeed, the newly revised Model Penal Code section encourages the use
such actuarial predictions of risk, noting that “well-designed actuarial riskassessment tools offer better predictions of future behavior than the clinical
judgments of treatment professionals such as psychiatrists and psychologists, or
the intuitions of criminal-justice professionals such as judges and probation officers.”51 However, a recent study concluded that the widely used commercial
risk assessment software COMPAS—the subject of the ProPublica report mencomputers, manuals, procedures, tests, and personnel, in order to protect a client against the
use of unreliable information during plea discussions, at pretrial hearings, at trial, and at sentencing.”).
44 Chodosh, supra note 40 (“Algorithms sold to courts across the United States have been
crunching those numbers since 2000. And they did so without much oversight or criticism,
until ProPublica released an investigation showing the bias of one particular system against
black defendants.”).
45 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/
Y5QY-YBGX].
46 Id. Broward County used the COMPAS software for pretrial bail decisions, not for sentencing purposes. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. It is important to note that Northpointe sent ProPublica a letter, wherein it “criticized
ProPublica’s methodology and defended the accuracy of its test: ‘Northpointe does not agree
that the results of your analysis, or the claims being made based upon that analysis, are correct or that they accurately reflect the outcomes from the application of the model.’ ” Id.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Stephanie Wykstra, Just How Transparent Can a Criminal Justice Algorithm
Be?, SLATE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/07/pennsylvania-commissionon-sentencing-is-trying-to-make-its-algorithm-transparent.html [https://perma.cc/V9LD-K
SPT] (discussing activists who spoke out against Pennsylvania’s proposed predictive sentencing algorithm, noting that they were worried that it would “increase racial disparities”).
51
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03, cmt. f. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014).
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tioned above—was “no more accurate or fair than the predictions of people
with little or no criminal justice expertise.”52
To date, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is the tribunal that has performed
the most substantive review of a challenge to the use of sentencing algorithms.53 In State v. Loomis,54 the defendant Eric Loomis challenged the use of
his COMPAS score in his sentencing, which “indicated that he presented a high
risk of recidivism on all three bar charts [representing pretrial recidivism risk,
general recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk.]”55 Loomis argued that the
use of the score violated his due process rights, in part because the algorithm
used by COMPAS is a trade secret and so “the proprietary nature of COMPAS
prevent[ed] him from assessing its accuracy . . . . ”56 The court rejected that argument, holding that “if used properly with an awareness of the limitations and
cautions, [use] of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a
defendant’s right to due process.”57 In so holding, the court noted that
COMPAS used only publicly available information in formulating a risk score,
and so “to the extent that Loomis’s risk assessment [was] based upon his answers to questions and publicly available data about his criminal history,
Loomis had the opportunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on
the COMPAS report were accurate.”58
The court did, however, provide some guidelines to lower courts about the
proper way to use COMPAS scores. First, the court held that risks scores could
not be used: “(1) to determine whether an offender is incarcerated; or (2) to determine the severity of the sentence,” or (3) “as the determinative factor in deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the
community.”59 Further, the scores must come with certain written cautions
warning judges about their proper use.60 Those cautions include that “[a]
COMPAS risk assessment compares defendants to a national sample, but no
cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet been completed. Risk
assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-normed for accuracy due
to changing populations and subpopulations[,]” and that “COMPAS was not
developed for use at sentencing, but was intended for use by the Department of
52

Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism,
4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 3 (2018); see also Chodosh, supra note 40 (when “a group of 462 people were simply asked whether they thought [a] defendant was likely to commit another
crime in the next two years[] [t]hey did so with almost exactly the same accuracy—and bias—as the COMPAS algorithm.”).
53 The United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision. Loomis v. Wisconsin,
137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
54 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
55 Id. at 753–55.
56 Id. at 757.
57 Id. at 770.
58 Id. at 761.
59 Id. at 769.
60
Id.
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Corrections in making determinations regarding treatment, supervision, and parole.”61
It is unclear what impact these admonitions from the Wisconsin Supreme
Court will have on lower courts who continue to use the COMPAS scores as
part of the sentencing process. As Dartmouth computer scientist Hany Farid
said when he studied COMPAS:
Our concern is that when you have software like COMPAS that’s a black box,
that sounds complicated and fancy, that the judges may not be applying the proportional amount of confidence as they would if we said ‘[twelve] people online
think this person is high risk’ . . . Maybe we should be a little concerned that we
have multiple commercial entities selling algorithms to courts that haven’t been
analyzed. Maybe someone like the Department of Justice should be in the business of putting these algorithms through a vetting process. That seems like a reasonable thing to do.62

2. Predictive Policing
Algorithms are not just used to help sentence people once they have been
arrested; they are also used to determine who is most likely to commit a crime
in the first place. In Chicago, almost 400,000 citizens have an “official police
risk score[,]” ranging from 1 to 500-plus.63 The algorithm that police used to
develop these scores is not publicly available, but it influences a stunning array
of police decisions, from who receives a home visit by police officers to who
receives additional police surveillance.64 In 2013, the Chicago Police Department placed approximately 400 people on a “heat list,” a list of people who
“had all been forecast to be potentially involved in violent crime, based on an
analysis of geographic location and arrest data.”65 The heat list included people
like Robert McDaniel, a then twenty–two–year–old black man who received an
unannounced visit from the police warning him “not to commit any further
crimes[,]” despite the fact that he had committed no crimes and had no violent
criminal record.66
The use of predictive policing like that in Chicago is on the rise, and “[t]he
technology has far outpaced any legal or political accountability and has largely
escaped academic scrutiny.”67 For over a year in Boston, police identified po-

61

Id. at 769–70.
Chodosh, supra note 40.
63 Andrew G. Ferguson, The Police are Using Computer Algorithms to Tell If You’re a
Threat, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017), https://time.com/4966125/police-departments-algorithms-chi
cago [https://perma.cc/NCL6-3XD4].
64 Id.
65 Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 15 (2016).
66 Id.
67 Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1109
(2017).
62
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tential threats by monitoring people’s social media accounts.68 But the tool they
used has been decried as unfair, given that it “swept up the posts of people using the hashtag #MuslimLivesMatter and a lawmaker’s Facebook update about
racial inequality” in its attempt to predict violence.69 The police department
planned to spend $1.4 million for the software but “dropped those plans amid
backlash from groups like the ACLU,” who argued that the social media monitoring “appear[ed] to have had little benefit to public safety while unfairly focusing on groups such as Muslims.”70
The Brennan Center for Justice has sued the New York City Police Department over its use of predictive policing, especially its refusal to provide
certain information about the algorithm at use.71 That case is presently winding
its way through discovery, and the New York state judge presiding over the
case has ordered the city to turn over large amounts of information about the
software it uses.72 Similar lawsuits have been filed by activists in Chicago73 and
Los Angeles.74 The outcomes of these cases may well be instructive for predicting how courts may treat challenges to the online monitoring of students.
C. Current Cyber-Monitoring of High School Students
As the companies that provide social-media-monitoring services came under fire for their contracts with police districts, some quietly turned their attention to servicing schools instead.75 All across America, school districts have entered into agreements with software companies to use artificial intelligence to
monitor students. In Billerica, Massachusetts, high schools monitor students’
social-media accounts, both to prevent school violence and also to flag those at

68

Alanna D. Richer, Boston Police’s Social Media Surveillance Unfairly Targeted Muslims,
ACLU Says, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/
02/07/boston-police-social-media-surveillance-unfairly-targeted-muslims-aclusays/9JUpzPmy8Tsr5RLxvCm61M/story.html [https://perma.cc/E9R5-35V9].
69
Id.
70 Id.
71 Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Erica Posey, Predictive Policing Goes to Court, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opini
on/predictive-policing-goes-court [https://perma.cc/G95J-6C9A].
72 Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t., No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL 6610414, at
*8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017).
73 Dave Collins, Police Departments Sued Over Predictive Policing Programs, POLICEONE
(Jul. 5, 2018), https://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/police-departments-sued-over-pre
dictive-policing-programs-oEOyziTEEgyMrLNv [https://perma.cc/FS7U-B5J9].
74 Brenda Gazzar, Activists File Lawsuit Over LAPD’s Predictive Policing Program, GOV’T
TECH. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Activists-File-Lawsuit-OverLAPDs-Predictive-Policing-Program.html [https://perma.cc/RT5W-J9AX].
75 See Aaron Liebowitz, Could Monitoring Students on Social Media Stop the Next School
Shooting?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/socialmedia-monitoring-school-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/T3XX-JM9W].
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risk of suicide.76 In Huntsville, Alabama, students have been expelled for
tweets.77 The Glendale Unified School District in California hired a company to
monitor online bullying.78 One company, Social Sentinel, claims to have contracts with school districts in thirty states.79
Machine learning features prominently in the monitoring services these
companies provide to the school districts they contract with. The algorithms
that are being developed are predicated on the theory that we may be able to
accurately predict which students are going to become violent by looking for
patterns in their online activities.80 One CEO explained that when his company
developed its social media monitoring algorithm:
“We went back . . . and looked at the language that school shooters, as one example, have used in the past in various manifestos—what’s been published or
that they’ve shared on social media . . . . And we went to understand similarities
and patterns. And we can teach computers, to an extent, how to identify some of
that nuance.”81

The companies that offer the social-media monitoring to school districts
commonly use a method called “geofencing,” wherein software is programmed
to trawl various social-media sites within a specified geographic area and to
flag posts containing certain keywords for school administrators to review.82
Despite the serious problems with facial recognition software and bias discussed earlier, that technology is also being marketed to school districts for use
on students.83
How effective is this monitoring? It’s difficult to assess the efficacy of social-media monitoring to disrupt something like a school shooting, since those
76

Lynn Jolicoeur & Lisa Mullins, To Detect Threats and Prevent Suicides, Schools Pay
Company to Scan Social Media Posts, WBUR (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.wbur.org/news/
2018/03/22/school-threats-suicide-prevention-tech [https://perma.cc/N9U5-M74U].
77 Liebowitz, supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 Id. Even those school districts that have not hired third parties to monitor their students
through algorithms still monitor their students in the more “old-fashioned” way—by “relying
on students or parents as whistleblowers who bring alarming circumstances to the school
administration’s attention.” Catherine E. Mendola, Note, Big Brother as Parent: Using Surveillance to Patrol Students’ Internet Speech, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 153, 168 (2015).
80 See, e.g., Randy Rieland, Can Artificial Intelligence Help Stop School Shootings?,
SMITHSONIAN (June 22, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/can-artificialintelligence-help-stop-school-shootings [https://perma.cc/AXJ5-8NBP] (“The idea is that
algorithms might be able to better analyze data related to school shootings, and perhaps even
identify patterns in student language or behavior that could foreshadow school violence.”).
81 Jolicoeur & Mullins, supra note 76.
82 Liebowitz, supra note 75 (noting that geofencing technology allows companies to “sweep
up posts within a given geographic area and use keywords to narrow the pool.”); see also
Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 127, 133 (2018) (“Geofencing builds a ‘virtual fence’ around a designated
physical location and permits social media posts from that defined area to be identified and
stored.”).
83
Id. at 133–34.
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remain (fortunately) very rare events.84 Assuming for the sake of argument that
this kind of surveillance was successful at reducing school shootings, how
would we know? It would be difficult to state with any confidence that online
surveillance had definitively stopped any one particular school shooting, as it
would be hard to authoritatively state that such a shooting absolutely would
have occurred but for the intervention. A New York Times investigation concluded that there was “little evidence” that social-media monitoring of students
has “helped ferret out brewing threats of violence, bullying or self-harm . . . .”85
“False negatives,” wherein the software would fail to alert school officials
to a student who is planning to engage in violent acts, is not the only way the
software could fail. There is also great potential for “false positives”—students
who might be flagged for some reason and subject to intervention but who
would never have engaged in violence. These are students who might fit the
stereotypical (and inaccurate) “profile” of a school shooter that has taken root
in the public imagination despite there being no empirical evidence of any such
particular profile.86 They might be students who are “fascinated with guns, violent video games and dark song lyrics—but would never turn violent.”87 It cannot be overstated that false positives could be potentially devastating for the
students who are inaccurately identified as being at risk for violence. Despite
the instinct by some to downplay the potential impact,88 the student who is
falsely labeled at risk faces stigma as well as potential disciplinary actions.89
One scholar has concluded that schools engaging in professional surveillance of
their students are not only engaging in actions that are “ineffective,” but ones
84

See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears et al., Columbine Revisited: Myths and Realities About the Bullying-School Shootings Connection, 12 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 939, 942 (2017) (noting that
“although school shootings receive widespread media coverage, it is not clear that school
shootings have dramatically increased” in the past decades); see also Rhitu Chatterjee,
School Shooters: What’s Their Path to Violence?, NPR (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org
/sections/health-shots/2019/02/10/690372199/school-shooters-whats-their-path-to-violence
[https://perma.cc/LCP3-7TYT] (reporting that “there have been [eleven] mass shootings
(where four or more people died) in schools since the Columbine High School shooting in
. . . 1999”).
85 Liebowitz, supra note 75.
86 Mears et al., supra note 84, at 943 (noting that researchers have investigated a number of
possible “causal factors” for school shootings, including: “a history of being bullied; mental
illness; . . . being a ‘loner’; dressing and acting ‘Goth’; . . . exposure to violent video games
and graphic violence; listening to violent music; . . . and an interest in weapons,” but concluding that “none of these factors, or any others, have been shown to exert an effect on the
probability of school shootings or of individuals becoming school shooters . . . .”).
87 Jolicoeur & Mullins, supra note 76.
88 See, e.g., Germain Chastel, Predictive Algorithms Are Infiltrating Schools—Here’s Why
That’s a Good Thing, NEXT WEB (May 27, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/contributors/
2018/05/27/predictive-algorithms-are-infiltrating-schools-heres-why-thats-a-good-thing
[https://perma.cc/3WBY-ESCD] (“The worst case scenario [of a false positive] is a child
feeling upset at being placed in an intervention program when it’s not necessarily needed.”).
89 Mears et al., supra note 84, at 949 (the “high false positive rate [for predicting school
shooters] would result in many individuals being labeled, and possibly harmed from the labels . . . .”).
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that are “corrosive to a trusting relationship between students and their
schools.”90
Although the efficacy of programs to monitor students’ online activity is
questionable at best, the biased impact they have is painfully clear. According
to a Southern Poverty Law Center report, there has been a disproportionate impact as students of color are more likely to be suspended or expelled for their
social media posts.91 For example, the Huntsville, Alabama school district began monitoring its students’ social-media posts, going so far as to hire a former
FBI investigator (it appears this monitoring was more “old-fashioned” and relied on the investigator to flag activity, rather than an algorithm).92 In 2013–
2014, twelve of the fourteen students who were expelled for the content of their
social media were African American, despite the fact that African American
students make up only 40% of the district.93 One black student was suspended
for five days after a school resource officer assumed the young woman was in a
gang, because she posted a picture to her Instagram account of her wearing a
sweatshirt that featured an airbrushed image of her father, who had been violently murdered.94 The school resource officer was suspicious that the colors of
her sweatshirt indicated gang involvement.95
The racial disparity in the expulsions in Huntsville are not a statistical
anomaly. Nationwide, students of color face school discipline that is harsher
and more frequent than their white counterparts. A 2018 Government Accountability Office report concluded that black students comprised approximately
15% of all public-school students but represented almost 39% of school suspensions.96 Despite the fact that activists and scholars have been decrying this
racial discrepancy for decades now, Department of Education data show that
the disparity is only continuing to grow.97 The consequences of this disparity
could not be more serious. Study after study concludes that students who are
expelled or suspended are much more likely to end up incarcerated as adults,
90

Mendola, supra note 79, at 158.
Sharada Jambulapati, Story from the Field: Children of Color Pushed Out of Alabama
Schools Over Social Media Posts, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (July 9, 2015), https://www.splcenter
.org/news/2015/07/09/story-field-children-color-pushed-out-alabama-schools-over-socialmedia-posts-0 [https://perma.cc/8Y2V-DFYB].
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-258, K-12 EDUCATION: DISCIPLINE
DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 12–13 (2018).
97 Moriah Balingit, Racial Disparities in School Discipline Are Growing, Federal Data
Show, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/racialdisparities-in-school-discipline-are-growing-federal-data-shows/2018/04/24/67b5d2b8-47e411e8-827e-190efaf1f1ee_story.html [https://perma.cc/D26D-4NK3] (“Black students faced
greater rates of suspension, expulsion and arrest than their white classmates, according to
federal data released [in April 2018], disparities that have widened despite efforts to fix
them.”).
91
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something at times referred to as the “school-to-prison pipeline.”98 Therefore
the frightening possibility emerges that the same technology that targets a student for discipline as a high schooler can then be used to label him as “high
risk” by his local police department and ultimately tell a judge that he is more
likely to reoffend when he is being sentenced.
D. The Myth of Objectivity and Neutrality: How Bias Can Exist in Each Stage
of Machine Learning
It is tempting to think of any artificial intelligence, including an algorithm,
as neutral and objective.99 Laypeople without technical expertise can be especially vulnerable to placing too much faith in algorithmic outcomes. “Computers have an aura of reliability that may be unwarranted, but nevertheless hard to
dispel. This is because many lawyers and judges do not adequately understand
information technology.”100 If an algorithm is developed to monitor students’
social media accounts for language that is violent or that threatens self-harm, it
is tempting to conclude that the algorithm itself cannot possibly be biased, as it
is simply a computer code. As one robotics researcher said in a TEDx Talk, “in
[artificial intelligence], we have Milgram’s ultimate authority figure,” and
many laypeople are tempted to place blind faith in it.101 But, “algorithms are
not infallible oracles,”102 and, as artificial intelligence researchers themselves

98

Amy B. Cyphert, Addressing Racial Disparities in Preschool Suspension and Expulsion
Rates, 82 TENN. L. REV. 893, 902–03 (2015).
Zero tolerance policies contribute negatively to what has been termed the ‘school to prison pipeline,’ wherein disciplinary policies and practices ‘push our nation’s schoolchildren, especially
our most at-risk children, out of classrooms and into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.’
Children who are suspended or expelled may be left unsupervised and therefore more likely to
get into legal trouble, and they certainly miss critical time in their classes, raising their risk for
dropping out.

Id. (citing Locating the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ACLU, http.www.aclu.org/images/
asset_upload_file966_35553.pdf).
99 Eidelman, supra note 19, at 924 (noting that “mechanized data analysis . . . offers an additional sheen of objectivity, neutrality, and complexity.”).
100 García, supra note 43, at 1049–50; see also Eidelman, supra note 19, at 923 (noting that,
“[n]otwithstanding the complexity of computerized algorithms, when their results are introduced in court, legal experts and prosecutors generally suggest that they are infallible and
that their results are foolproof, ‘overstat[ing] the probative value of their evidence, going far
beyond what the relevant science can justify.’ And juries, frequently deprived of the source
code or any countervailing testimony that could expose the algorithm’s potential pitfalls,
generally do not question the prosecution’s results.”).
101 Tedx Talks, The Real Reason to Be Afraid of Artificial Intelligence, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRzBk_KuIaM [https://perma.cc/3KTJ-G3A5]
(referring to social psychologist Stanley Milgram’s famous authority experiments where participants believed they were providing painful electrical shocks to other people and kept doing so because an authority figure told them to).
102
Eidelman, supra note 19, at 923.
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concede, “algorithms (and the complex systems they are a part of) can make
mistakes” and those mistakes can often involve bias.103
Arguments that outputs resulting from machine learning are somehow devoid of bias harken back to those that critical race theorists had to confront regarding the objectivity and neutrality of law.104 “Critical race theory expresses
skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality,”105 and “[p]ioneering
theorists . . . lead the charge to expose the structural effects of racism embedded in the law and to rebut the notion that the law is neutral and color-blind.”106
These algorithms do not appear as oracles in the sky, however. Rather, they are
the products of humans, with our imperfect biases, and they often capture and
magnify those biases.107 As shown below, there is potential for bias at every
step of the process of using an algorithm to monitor the online activity of students,108 and if programmers and data scientists are “not careful, the process
can result in disproportionately adverse outcomes concentrated within historically disadvantaged groups in ways that look a lot like discrimination.”109
1. Specifying the Outputs
In an early stage of machine learning, the programmers ask, “What do we
wish to accomplish?” and determine the results they want their model to produce. Put another way, “programmers must specify an algorithm’s output vari103

Rachel Thomas, Five Things That Scare Me About AI, FAST AI (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.fast.ai/2019/01/29/five-scary-things [https://perma.cc/7G9P-M7VW].
104 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 323 (1987) (noting that “black people” understand that any “claim to neutral application of legal principles is false.”).
105 MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1993).
106 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., What the Tea Party Movement Means for Contemporary Race Relations: A Historical and Contextual Analysis, 7 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP.
201, 240–41 (2015).
107 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 717 (“From the moment these humans conceptualize a
predictive task to the moment the running model is deployed, they exert significant and articulable influence over everything from how the data are cleaned to how simple or complex
the algorithm’s learning process is.”).
108 As noted in supra note 15, Lehr & Ohm suggest that there are eight discrete steps in the
machine learning process. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 670. Their excellent article discusses an earlier article by Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, which delineates three steps in
machine learning and the possibility for bias therein. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 670; see
also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, at 678, 684, 688. Lehr and Ohm argue that Barocas
and Selbst’s article “fails to consider all of the stages of machine learning between input variable selection and the deployment of the running model,” and that in this failure “they neglect how the stages of machine learning that occur ‘inside’ the black box can provide opportunities to remedy” certain harms. Id. at 666 (emphasis omitted). Both of these articles
are excellent and have informed the analysis here. This Article generally examines the three
steps in the Barocas and Selbst article but deepens that analysis by selecting additional insights from the Lehr and Ohm article as well. See infra Section I.D.
109
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, at 673.
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able—what is to be estimated or predicted.”110 For an algorithm that has been
developed to monitor students’ online activity to predict some form of violence—either violence against other students or self-harm—one output variable
(also called the dependent variable) is just that—the likelihood that the student
will engage in acts of violence. Programmers “must translate some amorphous
problem”—here, how to predict school shootings or student suicides—“into a
question that can be expressed in more formal terms that computers can
parse.”111 There are many decisions that the programmers and data scientists
will have to make as they translate the data, and accordingly many opportunities for bias to creep in.
2. Constructing the Training Data Set
In the second step of developing a machine learning system, programmers
collect the training data, “quite literally, the data that train the model to behave
in a certain way.”112 For an algorithm that attempts to predict school violence,
that training data might include looking back over the language of the manifestos that school shooters had posted, as the CEO discussed above acknowledged
his programmers did. They might look for certain words to flag or patterns in
posting. Of course, “biased training data leads to discriminatory models,”113
and there are at least two distinct possibilities of bias in this stage of machine
learning.
First, the selection of the words that the algorithm will flag as potentially
“dangerous” is a fraught endeavor, and one that could lead to a “garbage in,
garbage out” problem.114 The programmers could “rely[] on data that reflect
existing human biases,”115 as in the case of the Boston Police Department’s decision to use a predictive policing algorithm that flagged search terms like
“Muslim Lives Matter.” When machine learning models have been used for the
process of “word embedding, a popular framework” where words are converted
to word vectors so that the algorithm can identify relationships between words,
researchers have found the resulting outputs “exhibit [gender] stereotypes to a

110

Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 665.
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, at 678.
112 Id. at 680; see also Eidelman, supra note 19, at 926 (“On the machine learning side, humans also impact the algorithm’s design by, for example, choosing the training data—
another decision that can have significant effects on the algorithm’s output and in ways that
differentially affect suspects of different races, ethnicities, or ancestral backgrounds.”).
113 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, at 680 (internal citations omitted).
114 See, e.g., Govind Chandrasekhar, The GIGO Principle in Machine Learning,
SEMANTICS3 BLOG (July 4, 2017), https://www.semantics3.com/blog/thoughts-on-the-gigoprinciple-in-machine-learning-4fbd3af43dc4 [https://perma.cc/4XBG-5F9S] (“Garbage-InGarbage-Out is the idea that the output of an algorithm, or any computer function for that
matter, is only as good as the quality of the input that it receives.”).
115
Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 665.
111
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disturbing extent.”116 For example, one algorithm completed the analogy “ ‘man
is to computer programmer as woman is to x’ with x=homemaker.”117
Second, because the data set of school shooters who have left online manifestos is (fortunately) relatively small, the ability to cull enough meaningful data from it to train an algorithm is questionable. School shootings are rare
events,118 and attempting to predict them is a difficult task, with a heightened
risk of “false positives.” Although machine learning can be used to help predict
rare events, in order to improve the accuracy in a rare event prediction scenario,
a common method is to obtain as large a data set as possible to train and test the
algorithm.119 Even then accuracy is not, of course, guaranteed, only theoretically improved.120 “Although there is no technical bar to running machinelearning algorithms on small data sets, doing so is, in practice, pointless,” and
the smaller the dataset, the less accurate the machine-learning algorithm.121
3. Feature Engineering
In the stage of machine learning known as feature selection or feature engineering, programmers “make choices about what attributes they observe and
subsequently fold into their analyses.”122 In the feature engineering stage, the
goal is to transform the raw data from the training data set into formats that will
better facilitate the machine learning process.123 For a model attempting to pre116

Tolga Bolukbasi et al., Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker?
Debiasing Word Embeddings, CORNELL, 1 (July 21, 2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.06520
[https://perma.cc/63YG-E5QS].
117 Id. at 3.
118 David Ropeik, School Shootings Are Extraordinarily Rare. Why is Fear of Them Driving
Policy?, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/school-s
hootings-are-extraordinarily-rare-why-is-fear-of-them-driving-policy/2018/03/08/f4ead9f22247-11e8-94da-ebf9d112159c_story.html [https://perma.cc/VPC6-ZJNV] (“[T]he statistical
likelihood of any given public school student being killed by a gun, in school, on any given
day since 1999 was roughly 1 in 614,000,000. And since the 1990s, shootings at schools
have been getting less common.”).
119 See Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 POL.
ANALYSIS 137, 137 (2001) (noting that “commonly used data collection strategies are grossly
inefficient for rare events data. The fear of collecting data with too few events has led to data
collections with huge numbers of observations but relatively few, and poorly measured, explanatory variables”).
120 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 15, at 678–79, 687 (“Often, machine learning is applied to predict exactly these kinds of rare events, but evenly splitting a dataset into training and test data could risk few of these observations ending up in the training data.”).
121 Id. at 678 (“To reap the predictive benefits of machine learning, a sufficiently large number of observations is required.”).
122 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 24, at 688.
123 See, e.g., Warren E. Agin, Using Machine Learning to Predict Success or Failure in
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, in 2018 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 369, 390 (William
L. Norton & Richard Lieb eds., 2018) (noting that feature engineering involves
“[t]ransform[ing] some of the data . . . to create new data fields (or features) that might better
suit the machine learning program’s processes.”).
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dict school violence from social-media posts, the feature engineering stage
might involve data scientists augmenting the raw data of words in school
shooter manifestos by identifying synonyms for certain violent words. For example, if the manifestos frequently include the word “die,” data scientists may
choose to also include terms like “death” or “dead” or “dying.” That same data
scientist may choose to exclude the term “killer,” recognizing that it is often
used by teenagers slangily as an adjective (“that was a killer party!”). Obviously, there is an art to decisions like these, and the possibility for bias with these
kinds of decisions.
4. Training the Model
In the next stage of machine learning, the transformed data is used to train
the model. The goal of the model at this point is to figure out what features
within the data training set are predictive and which are statistical white
noise.124 In our example, the model would run sophisticated statistical algorithms to answer questions such as whether the time of day a social media post
was made is significant with respect to predicting our output data, school violence. If the model determines that feature is highly predictive of school violence, it will update itself accordingly by placing higher weight on it in its subsequent calculations. This process may repeat itself millions of times as the
model focuses on hundreds or even thousands of features. The model might ultimately conclude that features that seem innocuous: tweeting in the early
morning hours, quoting lyrics from certain artists, etc., are statistically correlated with becoming violent. It is critical to note that, depending on the technology used to create it, the model would not necessarily be able to communicate to
the programmers—or the assistant principal who receives a notification that a
post was flagged—what features or feature combinations caused it to flag the
post.
5. Testing and Validating the Model
At this point, after training is complete, the model will be tested on a test
set of data. The test set of data for our example would include both innocuous
social media posts from students who did not go on to commit any violence, as
well as posts from students who did. How accurately does the model flag language and predict that its author will go on to commit violence? Through this
validation process, a data scientist can determine the model’s theoretical error

124

See Hyunjong Ryan Jin, Think Big! The Need for Patent Rights in the Era of Big Data
and Machine Learning, 7 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 78, 91–92 (2018) (“The objective of machine learning models is to identify and quantify ‘features’ from a given data set
. . . . Through this process, the machine learning algorithm selects the model that best describes the characteristics and trends of the target features from the test and validation
sets.”).
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rate.125 How often did it correctly predict that a post in the data test set was
made by a student who was about to become violent? Of course, the theoretical
error rate is just that: performance on a test set is not a guarantee of similar performance in real life on actual new data.
6. Interpreting the Outputs
Once the training, testing, and validating is complete, the algorithm will be
ready to produce outputs. For an algorithm designed to predict the likelihood of
future violence from a student’s social-media posts, that output would presumably send some sort of alert to school officials warning them that a post has
been flagged. Bias is possible at this stage as well, given that “at the output
stage, people interpret the algorithm’s results and translate them into terms that
others can understand.”126 Someone will have to decide what threshold is worthy of a flag being sent. If the algorithm is a probabilistic model and determines
that a post is 34% likely to indicate that the student is contemplating violence,
is that a high enough percentage? What about 18%? Ultimately, an algorithm
will not discipline a high school student for a tweet. Some school official will
have to review the tweet once it has been flagged and make a decision about
whether to discipline the student or not. In light of the well-documented racial
disparities present in school discipline decisions, there is good reason to worry
about bias.
7. A Black Box?
At the end of the machine learning process, we have a machine learning
model. That model has been developed through data inputs, data that was refined through feature engineering. The model has performed statistical analyses—machine learning algorithms—on this data in an attempt to predict an
output. After testing it on our data test set, we have an error rate, one that, if
well-designed, should theoretically tell us how the model will perform in the
real world. What we usually do not have is an easy, human-understandable explanation of how a given output was achieved by the model based upon a given
input. We do not have an easy explanation of exactly how the model weighs
every feature, complicated by the fact that the model may weigh countless
combinations of features, and may weigh feature combinations differently with
each prediction it makes. Hence, the popular narrative that machine learning
models are “black boxes” where it is impossible to know why they make the
prediction/produce the output they do.127 Despite the persistence of this narra125

See id. at 92 (“The test set is then used to calculate the generalized prediction error,
which is reported to the end user for proper assessment of the predictive power of the model.”).
126 Eidelman, supra note 19, at 927.
127 See, e.g., H. James Wilson, et al., The Future of AI Will Be About Less Data, Not More,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-future-of-ai-will-be-about-less-
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tive, as is shown above, there are several stages in the machine learning process
where humans are making decisions and where safeguards can help control
against bias.128 Part III of this Article includes several policy recommendations
for doing just that.
II. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES
As journalists continue to write about the online surveillance many schools
are conducting of their students, the issue is turning into a “nationwide controversy.”129 Many scholars are beginning their analysis with the question, “is this
even legal?” According to the director of legal advocacy for the National
School Boards Association, “[s]chool lawyers are advising administrators to be
‘very cautious,’ ” when it comes to online monitoring of their students.130 The
question of legality is made more complicated because the Supreme Court has
declined to rule on cases that deal with online student speech, leaving the question of what kind of monitoring and discipline is appropriate to the lower courts
for now.131 “Given that the Supreme Court has not ruled on off-campus Internet
speech, the legality of student Internet surveillance carried out by schools remains uncertain.”132 Of course, to the extent that this Article examines constitutional challenges to schools’ online monitoring of their students, such a challenge is only available to students at public schools (which are state actors) or
to students in public and private schools in states that have provided a state law
corollary to the constitutional right at issue.133

data-not-more [https://perma.cc/AVU7-ZETH] (“[T]hese [machine learning] systems are
black boxes—it’s not clear how they use input data to arrive at outputs like actions or decisions.”).
128 See, e.g., Lehr and Ohm, supra note 15, at 657 (“As many have documented, a running
model is often viewed as an inscrutable black box, but there are opportunities for auditing
(record-keeping requirements, keystroke loggers, etc.) and mandated interpretability during
playing with the data . . . . Regulation skeptics . . . often rely on descriptions of machine
learning as more art than science,” which runs the risk of “inappropriately assum[ing] that
black-box algorithms have black-box workflows; [despite the fact that] the steps of playing
with the data are actually quite articulable.”).
129 See Maiya Dempsey, Easy to Say, Easy to See: Social Media and the Constitutional
Rights of Public School Students, 17 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 82, 90–91 (2018)
(“As technology has developed and students have growing access to the Internet and social
media, the issue of whether a school can monitor its students’ social media accounts has become a nationwide controversy.”).
130 Liebowitz, supra note 75.
131 See Mendola, supra note 79, at 157 (“In January 2012, the Court denied certiorari for
three cases involving student Internet speech, any of which could have established necessary
guidelines for school action in response to student Internet speech.”).
132 Id. at 168.
133 See Michael K. Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 405, 414–15 (2016) (explaining that the First Amendment applies only to government
action, not to private action, and so only to public schools, but also noting that “a few states
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A. Cyberbullying Laws
In order to assess the legality of the use of machine-learning algorithms to
monitor high school students, it is important to understand the legal landscape
of cyberbullying laws that school districts operate under. “Cyberbullying laws,
mostly passed as part of states’ education codes, prohibit cyberbullying, or bullying by electronic means, and provide schools with the authority to discipline
students for it.”134 These laws exist in some form in every state,135 though only
a handful of states have laws that explicitly define cyberbullying as something
distinct from traditional bullying that happens in an online forum.136 The laws
vary from state to state, but in general they prohibit students from taking actions that put other students in reasonable fear of harm, or otherwise harassing
fellow students.137 One scholar has categorized the degree of surveillance authority that the laws grant to schools in three ways:
(1) a grant of authority with no nexus to school or school-related activity; (2) a
grant of authority with a limited nexus to school or school-related activity; and
(3) a grant requiring a relatively substantial nexus to school or school-related activity. The vast majority of cyberbullying laws provide schools with surveillance
authority that falls into one of the first two categories. In those states, the
schools have nearly unlimited or unlimited surveillance authority over students’
online and electronic activity.138

Although none of the cyberbullying laws explicitly direct schools to monitor students’ social media or other online activity, the laws implicitly do so.139
Further, fourteen states extend the scope of school authorities to regulate offcampus student speech140 (a decision with consequences under the First and
Fourth Amendments’ precedents discussed below). Although schools can conduct this surveillance themselves, as noted above, many are increasingly turn. . . have tried to provide students at private educational institutions with free speech protections parallel to those in the First Amendment.”).
134 Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School
Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 63, 65 (2014).
135 Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: A
Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Digital Age, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1590 n.404 (2017) (“In 2015, Montana became the last state in the
nation to enact anti-bullying legislation.”) (internal citations omitted).
136 Suski, supra note 134, at 73 (discussing in 2014 that twenty-five states had laws that
were “simply additions to or variations of . . . general definitions of bullying,” but that sixteen states had “separate statutory or regulatory definitions of cyberbullying.”).
137 Id. at 71.
138 Id. at 70–71.
139 Id. at 74 (“[A]ll of the states with cyberbullying laws authorize schools to monitor students’ online and electronic activity. None, however, do so explicitly. Instead, they implicitly allow schools to engage in surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity by authorizing or requiring that schools discipline students for electronic acts that constitute
bullying.”).
140 Philip Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the Regulation
of Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 848 (2016).
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ing to software companies to comply with their monitoring obligations under
cyberbullying laws.141
B. First Amendment Challenges
There are two different legal challenges that could be made under the First
Amendment to the online monitoring of students. First, students who are actually disciplined by their public school for social media posts they made outside
of school property and outside of school hours may have a viable First
Amendment claim against their school. As Section II.B.1 below explains, the
success of any such claim will be more dependent on the content of the speech
than on the fact that it was made off campus. Second, the very practice of
monitoring students’ online speech—whether with machine learning or through
more “old-fashioned” methods—could be challenged as an unlawful prior restraint, even where schools are not disciplining students on the basis of what
they post.142 This strategy has been examined by scholars but is presently hypothetical, as no court has ever ruled on the issue.143
1. Challenge by Disciplined Students
As a threshold matter, the legality of free speech regulation often turns on a
“forum analysis,” wherein the level of restriction that the government can impose on speech depends on the location of the speaker and where—the more
traditionally public the space is, the less the government may regulate speech
there.144 For example—for a traditionally public forum, like a street corner,
content-based restriction of individual speech violates the First Amendment
“unless the government can pass strict scrutiny, showing the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.”145 Conversely, for
a traditionally “nonpublic” forum, like a jail, the government need only establish that a content-based restriction is reasonable.146

141

Suski, supra note 134, at 63, 76–77 (“As explained below, most of the states have this
implicit authority, and some schools are therefore starting to employ companies, such as Geo
Listening and Safe Outlook Corporation, to conduct comprehensive surveillance of students.”).
142 See infra Section II.B.2.
143 See infra Section II.B.2.
144 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (“In
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed . . . A second category consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the public as
a place for expressive activity . . . . Public property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication is governed by different standards.”); see also Nisha Chandran, Crossing the Line: When Cyberbullying Prevention Operates as a Prior Restraint on
Student Speech, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 277, 290 (2016).
145 Id.; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
146
Chandran, supra note 144, at 290.
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In the school setting, the Supreme Court has held that schools have more
latitude to regulate student speech than the government does to regulate the
speech of adults,147 especially if that speech is lewd,148 encourages illegal activity like drug use,149 or is somehow school-sponsored, such as in the case of a
school newspaper.150 The Supreme Court has also held that schools can sometimes regulate student speech made outside of school grounds where such
speech occurs during a school-sponsored activity or during school hours.151
However, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on what latitude schools have in
regulating student speech that is entirely off campus and not during school
hours or school activities.152
In the seminal school-free-speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,153 the Supreme Court famously noted that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gates.”154 The students in Tinker were suspended from their
high school when they wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.155
The Court noted that such speech “[did] not concern speech or action that intrude[d] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students,”156 and
that the school’s “undifferentiated fear or apprehension” that the students might
cause a disturbance was not enough to justify the infringement on their First
Amendment rights.157 Although the conduct at issue occurred during school,
the Court cautioned that “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized . . . .”158 Thus, the
Tinker Court made clear that schools could regulate student speech made with-

147

See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.”).
148 Id. at 677–78, 685 (finding no First Amendment violation when a school disciplined a
student who made a speech at a school assembly where he referred to another student “in
terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”).
149 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 403 (2007) (finding no First Amendment violation when a school disciplined students for unfurling a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” at an off-campus, school-sanctioned, school-supervised event).
150 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 276 (1988) (finding no First
Amendment violation when a school stopped student journalists from publishing an article in
the student newspaper).
151 Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
152 See, e.g., Mendola, supra note 79, at 156–57.
153 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
154 Id. at 506.
155 Id. at 504.
156 Id. at 508.
157 Id.
158
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
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in the school or even outside it where it disrupted the school’s work or invaded
the rights of others, but not otherwise.159
Tinker itself dealt with student speech made within the school grounds during the school day. Of course, “[a] school’s action in response to its students’
Internet postings has several characteristics that make it distinct from a strict
free speech issue,” including that even when students are posting from their
own homes, on their own time, and on their own machines, students can still
sometimes post about school or can be communicating with their classmates.160
So what about a student who is tweeting or posting to Instagram outside of
school property and outside of school hours? What level of regulation, if any,
may a school constitutionally exercise over such student speech? “The federal
appellate courts have . . . been left to grapple with applying the Tinker standard
to address discipline of students’ online speech when it does not occur in the
school building or at a school-related or sponsored event.”161 So far, seven circuits have examined the question of whether Tinker applies to student conduct
that occurs outside of school grounds with six of them concluding it does and
the seventh assuming it does without formally holding so.162
In one of the most recent decisions to hold that Tinker applies to offcampus, electronic speech by students, the Fifth Circuit examined how the
school environment had changed since that holding. In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,163 the Fifth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, held that the Tinker
rule applied to student speech made on the internet, “even when such speech
originated, and was disseminated, off-campus without the use of school resources.”164 In Bell, a high school student recorded a rap video which he posted
159

Id. at 512–13.
Mendola, supra note 79, at 157–58.
161 Suski, supra note 134, at 89.
162 See Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“We
need not decide how far Tinker’s ‘in class or out of it’ language extends. It is enough to hold,
as we do, that Tinker does not foreclose a school from regulating all off-campus conduct.”);
C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a school district has authority to discipline students for off-campus, sexually harassing speech); Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussed at length below);
S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that
school could discipline twin students for a website they created, even when made off campus, provided that it was “targeted at” the school community); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty.
Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding a school district did not violate a
student’s First Amendment rights by suspending her for creating a website on which other
students posted defamatory information about a classmate); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d
41, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”) (internal citation omitted).
The remainder of the circuits (First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, D.C.) do not appear to have addressed the question of whether Tinker can be applied to off-campus speech by students.
163 Bell, 799 F.3d at 379.
164
Id. at 396.
160

20 NEV. L.J. 457

484

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

to the internet, first on his publicly accessible Facebook page and then on
YouTube.165 The rap lyrics, which the Fifth Circuit described as “incredibly
profane and vulgar,” named two high school coaches, alleged that they were
having sexual relationships with students, and made several threatening remarks about harming the teachers with guns.166 Although there is no indication
that the school was monitoring the student’s Facebook page, the wife of one of
the teachers heard about the recording from a friend and alerted her husband,
who alerted the principal.167 A disciplinary committee ultimately decided that
the rap lyrics “constituted harassment and intimidation of two teachers” and
recommended that the student be given a seven-day suspension and then
“placed in the county’s alternative school for the remainder of the nine-week
grading period (approximately six weeks).”168 The student filed an action alleging that the discipline violated his First Amendment rights.169
The Fifth Circuit noted Tinker’s holding that students do not give up their
First Amendment rights simply by being students.170 But the court also noted
that these rights are not absolute, and cited to Supreme Court precedent for the
proposition that school students enjoy less expansive First Amendment rights
than adults, concluding that “certain speech, which would be protected in other
settings, might not be afforded First Amendment protection in the school setting.”171 The Fifth Circuit noted that “[t]he pervasive and omnipresent nature of
the Internet has obfuscated the on-campus/off-campus distinction” with respect
to school regulation of student speech.172 The court held that Tinker applied to
the conduct at issue and also acknowledged that the passage of time, horrors of
school shootings, and advances in technology were necessary to keep in mind
when applying the Tinker test.173 “Over [forty-five] years ago, when Tinker was
decided, the Internet, cellphones, smartphones, and digital social media did not
exist. The advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption by students
present new and evolving challenges for school administrators, confounding
previously delineated boundaries of permissible regulations.”174 The court emphasized in its analysis that schools were duty bound to be vigilant and pay
special attention to threats against teachers in light of recent school shootings.175 “This now-tragically common violence increases the importance of
165

Id. at 383.
Id. at 384–85.
167 Id. at 385.
168 Id. at 386.
169 Id. at 387.
170 Id. at 389 (citing to Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511 and noting that “[s]tudents qua students do not forfeit their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression.”).
171 Id. at 389–90 (internal citation omitted).
172 Id. at 395–96.
173 Id. at 392–93.
174 Id. at 392.
175 Id. at 392–93 (citations omitted) (“Greatly affecting this landscape is the recent rise in
incidents of violence against school communities. School administrators must be vigilant and
166
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clarifying the school’s authority to react to potential threats before violence
erupts.”176 The Fifth Circuit stopped short of defining the circumstances under
which off-campus speech may be restricted, holding that where, as there, a student directs the speech at the school community, and that speech includes harassment and intimidation of teachers, the school may regulate the speech.177
The only circuit that has addressed the issue and declined to hold that
schools may, consistent with Tinker, regulate off-campus speech is the Third
Circuit, and though it has spoken on the matter through a pair of twin opinions,
its position remains unsettled. On June 13, 2011, the Third Circuit published
two opinions that dealt with regulation of off-campus speech by students. In
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit found that a school district had violated the First Amendment rights of a student who was disciplined
for creating, off campus, a fake MySpace profile that included her middle
school principal’s official school photograph (though not his name).178 “The
profile contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense
and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the
principal and his family.”179 In its opinion reversing a grant of summary judgment on behalf of the school with respect to the student’s First Amendment
claims, the Third Circuit noted that the profile was “so outrageous that no one
took its content seriously” and that it could not be viewed at the school in any
event, as the school’s computers blocked MySpace.180 Because “[t]here [was]
no dispute that [the student’s] speech did not cause a substantial disruption in
the school,”181 and because “it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable that [the
student’s] speech would create a substantial disruption or material interference
in school,”182 the court held that the school’s actions in disciplining the student
violated her First Amendment rights.183 In so holding, the Third Circuit noted
that “[t]he Supreme Court [has] established a basic framework for assessing
student free speech claims in Tinker, and we will assume, without deciding,
that Tinker applies to [the student’s off-campus] speech in this case.”184

take seriously any statements by students resembling threats of violence, as well as harassment and intimidation posted online and made away from campus.”).
176 Id. at 393.
177 Id. at 394 (“Therefore, the next question is under what circumstances may off-campus
speech be restricted. Our court’s precedent is less developed in this regard. For the reasons
that follow, and in the light of the summary-judgment record, we need not adopt a specific
rule: rather, Bell’s admittedly intentionally directing at the school community his rap recording containing threats to, and harassment and intimidation of, two teachers permits Tinker’s
application in this instance.”).
178 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 920–21.
181 Id. at 928.
182 Id. at 930.
183 Id. at 920.
184
Id. at 926.
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Five of the J.S. judges joined a concurrence arguing that “the First
Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”185 Those judges
objected to the extension of Tinker to online speech made by students off of
school grounds, arguing that the Supreme Court’s subsequent school-speech
cases “underscored Tinker’s narrow reach.”186 According to the concurring
judges, “[a]pplying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a precedent with
ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at
school.”187
Of course, a concurrence is not a holding, even when, as with J.S., it is
signed by a plurality of the judges who hear a case. To underscore that the
Third Circuit was internally conflicted on this issue, on the same day it issued
its opinion in J.S., the Third Circuit also issued an opinion in Layshock v. Hermitage School District.188 That case rather remarkably also dealt with a student
who created a fake and embarrassing MySpace profile of his principal.189 The
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
student regarding his First Amendment claim, holding that the speech at issue
did not result in any substantial disruption.190 The court noted that:
[B]ecause the School District concedes that [the fake] profile did not cause disruption in the school, we do not think that the First Amendment can tolerate the
School District stretching its authority into [the student’s] grandmother’s home
and reaching [the student] while he is sitting at her computer after school in order to punish him for the expressive conduct that he engaged in there. 191

The court recognized that “Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed
solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the school yard,” but nonetheless
concluded that the ability of schools to regulate student speech is limited.192 “It
would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise
of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions
there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she participates in
school sponsored activities.”193
Thus, in all jurisdictions that have formally ruled on the question, student
speech that occurs off campus, including social-media posts or other online
speech, can still be regulated by school officials, and students can be disci185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id. at 936–38 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
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plined as if the speech was made on campus, provided the speech in some way
reaches and disrupts the school community.194 It is worth noting that where
courts have generally given the green light to schools regulating student speech
off campus, several state legislatures have taken a different approach. Oregon,
for example, explicitly defines “harassment, intimidation, or bullying” in its anti-bullying law as an act that “[t]akes place on or immediately adjacent to
school grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on school-provided transportation or at any official school bus stop . . .”195 It is also worth noting that while
many scholars argue that schools should not regulate off-campus student
speech,196 others disagree, arguing that cyberbullying is particularly harmful
and that schools are in the best position to protect their students from it.197
2. Prior Restraint Challenge to Online Monitoring
As a general rule, a “prior restraint” is something that “restricts speech in
advance on the basis of content and carries a presumption of unconstitutionality.”198 Under this doctrine, the government has less latitude to regulate speech
before it is made, even if that same speech can be lawfully regulated (and punished) once it is disseminated.199 “This preference is rooted in a foundational
tenet of U.S. law as it departed from English rule: a free society prefers to punish those who abuse rights of speech after they break the law, rather than to
suppress them and all others beforehand.”200 Prior restraints most often take
one of two forms: judicial injunctions (such as a court order forbidding the me-

194

See Park, supra note 133, at 439–43 (“The latest circuit court precedent . . . reveals that
school officials are given significantly broad authority to regulate online student speech that
is violent in character and threatens the safety of students and the school. . . . [L]ower courts
have given greater deference to the judgment of school officials with regards to speech limitations . . . .”).
195 OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2)(b) (2009); see also Lee, supra note 140, at 849–50 (noting
that Alabama, Oregon, and South Carolina all focus on on-campus speech in their cyberbullying laws).
196 See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 430 (2011) (“When student speech occurs outside of school
supervision, the speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a nonstudent’s speech.”); Suski, supra note 107, at 64 (“To protect students from excessive school
surveillance authority and attendant privacy harms, realistic limits need to be imposed on
school surveillance authority under the cyberbullying laws . . . .”).
197 Lee, supra note 140, at 858, 864 (“[T]here are three reasons that actual cases of cyberbullying require a different analysis: (1) the nature of the harm is unique; (2) other legal
remedies are inadequate to protect victims; and (3) schools are in the best position to protect
their students.”).
198 Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 42 (10th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
199 See Chandran, supra note 144, at 291 (“Under the prior restraint doctrine, the government is limited in its ability to restrain protected expression before it is disseminated, even
though the same expression could be constitutionally subjected to punishment after the fact
through civil and criminal liability.”).
200
Id.
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dia from publishing certain information) or administrative licensing schemes
(such as an ordinance requiring a parade license).201
Thus, it is no surprise that when it comes to student speech, the prior restraint doctrine has been invoked most often in regulation of student newspapers or the distribution of certain materials on campus.202 To date, no court has
addressed the application of the prior restraint doctrine to student speech that
occurs off campus.203 However, in a fascinating article, scholar Nisha Chandran
has examined the issue of whether online monitoring of student speech constitutes an unlawful prior restraint on their First Amendment rights.204 She concludes that online monitoring of students should be analyzed under a heightened scrutiny standard, as the “underlying policy concerns rendering prior
restraints presumptively unconstitutional directly parallel First Amendment
concerns with proactive cyberbullying prevention policies . . . .”205
Ms. Chandran notes that all of the cases that have examined student speech
made off campus to date, including those discussed in Section II.B.1 above,
have dealt with that speech after it is made, which is a reactive form of regulating speech.206 Social-media monitoring, by contrast, is proactive; it “diverge[s]
from the traditional pattern of punishment following a known student speech
violation and transform[s] it into a restraint on expression before dissemination
through monitoring surveillance or speech guidelines for private, off-campus
speech.”207 Ms. Chandran argues that because proactive online monitoring by
schools of their students is not the exclusive remedy to combat the harm of
cyberbullying, and that it “strip[s] the speaker of procedural protections characteristic of reactive litigation,” such monitoring amounts to forbidden censorship
on speech and should be held presumptively unconstitutional.208 The fact that
this monitoring is likely to be fueled by machine learning makes it even more
constitutionally suspicious. “Knowing that surveillance technology is often
based on computerized algorithms ‘triggered’ by buzzwords, students may also
choose to completely avoid speech on certain topics to avoid discipline even
though their speech would have been entirely innocuous.”209 Children and
teenagers may be especially vulnerable to this chilling effect,210 and of course it
201

Taylor, 713 F.3d at 42.
Chandran, supra note 144, at 294; see also Taylor, 713 F.3d at 34 (rejecting argument
that denying a student the ability to distribute rubber fetus dolls on campus was an unlawful
prior restraint).
203 Chandran, supra note 144, at 296 (“[N]o case to date has addressed the application of
prior restraint law to off-campus restrictions on student speech.”) (emphasis omitted).
204 Id. at 279.
205 Id. at 301.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 301–02 (emphasis omitted).
208 Id. at 302.
209 Id. at 304.
210 See A Machine of Paranoia: How Concerns for Student Safety May Chill Speech, NAT’L
COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Sept. 18, 2014), http://ncac.org/blog/a-machine-of202
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will be compounded by the fact that the algorithms may flag seemingly innocuous terms and report that they are statistically correlated with a higher likelihood of violence.
How likely might a court be to rule that a school’s social-media monitoring
program is an unlawful prior restraint on student speech? If the willingness of
federal appellate courts to extend Tinker to online speech made by students off
campus is any indication, not especially likely. As discussed above, each circuit
that has ruled on the issue has held that schools can regulate student online
speech when it disrupts the school environment (or even when it reasonably
might), and courts have also indicated a willingness to embrace more regulation
of student speech in light of school shootings.211 For those courts, a school district that can argue its online monitoring is an attempt to prevent school shootings is likely to be given more latitude, even if they adopt a heightened scrutiny
standard. Further, a court that ruled that online monitoring is unlawful would
perhaps have to invalidate as unconstitutional any state cyberbullying law that
required schools to monitor their students’ online activity in any way. Therefore, despite Ms. Chandran’s intriguing arguments, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ultimately rule that online monitoring of students operates as
an unlawful prior restraint on their speech.
C. Fourth Amendment Challenges
Just as students do not leave their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gates, even as schools have power to regulate certain kinds of student
speech, so too do students retain Fourth Amendment rights, even as schools
have the power to conduct certain kinds of searches. Further, “Fourth and First
Amendment[] [violations] may be interconnected: knowledge of unreasonable
searches regarding personal communication often chills speech by causing
speakers to self-censor.”212
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”213 The seminal case
outlining the power of schools to conduct searches of their students is New Jersey v. T.L.O.214 In that case, a high school student alleged that her vice principal’s in-school search of her purse, and his subsequent handing over of certain
drug paraphernalia found therein to the police, was an unlawful search and sei-

paranoia-how-concerns-for-student-safety-may-chill-speech [https://perma.cc/AB7Q-NYHR
] (“[S]urveillance can facilitate an anxious culture of self-censorship. Youth—especially in
places of learning—will feel as though their school is watching them constantly, on and off
campus, whenever they post.”).
211 See supra Section II.B.1.
212 Chandran, supra note 144, at 285.
213 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
214
New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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zure that violated her Fourth Amendment rights.215 The Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the search was unlawful, holding instead that it was reasonable under the circumstances.216
In rejecting the Fourth Amendment argument, the Court made several crucial holdings about the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to
school students. First, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures does apply to searches that are conducted by public school officials, an idea that the state of New Jersey had challenged and which courts at the time were divided on.217 The Court cited to the
holdings in Tinker and in Goss v. Lopez, reasoning that “[i]f school authorities
are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting
searches of their students.”218 The Court acknowledged that maintaining discipline can be a difficult task in a school but concluded that the situation “is not
so dire” that students should be treated like prisoners and afforded no legitimate
expectation of privacy while at school.219
Second, the Court held that although students maintain some Fourth
Amendment rights while in school, they do so with important limitations. In
language that sounds hopelessly quaint in the era of smart phones, the Court
noted that school “students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets
such non-disruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries.”220 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that students are to be afforded
somewhat less Fourth Amendment protection than adults, noting that “the
school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by
public authorities are ordinarily subject.”221 The Court held that school officials
need not seek a warrant before searching students, and that they also need not
have “probable cause” for the search.222 Rather, the Court held that “the legality
of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all
the circumstances, of the search.”223

215

Id. at 328–29.
Id. at 347–48.
217 Id. at 333–34.
218 Id. at 336.
219 Id. at 338–39 (“We are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”).
220 Id. at 339.
221 Id. at 340.
222 Id. at 341 (“We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding
that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need
of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that
the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.”).
223
Id. at 341.
216
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Third, the Court provided guidance on what a “reasonable” search would
look like within the confines of a school. The Court outlined a two-prong inquiry, citing to the seminal Fourth Amendment case Terry v. Ohio.224 First, reasonableness should be assessed by considering “whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,”225 a standard which is satisfied “when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search [would] turn up evidence that
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.”226 The second prong of the analysis asks “whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,”227 a standard that is met “when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction.”228
The Court returned to students’ Fourth Amendment rights in Vernonia
School District v. Acton,229 where a middle school football player challenged
his school’s requirement that athletes consent to undergo random drug tests as a
Fourth Amendment violation.230 In rejecting that argument, the Court held that
suspicionless searches (such as a requirement that any athlete undergo drug
testing even if there is no particular suspicion about the drug use of that particular athlete) in the context of school students do not necessarily violate the
Fourth Amendment.231 The Court reiterated T.L.O.’s holding that the “ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’ ”232 and noted that such an inquiry is not made in a vacuum and “cannot
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”233
The Supreme Court has not weighed in on whether online student surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Court has not weighed in at
all on whether any search conducted by school officials that occurs outside of
school is protected by the Fourth Amendment.234 But one district court did address the issue in ruling on a motion to dismiss.235 In R.S. v. Minnewaska Area

224

Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
Id.
226 Id. at 342.
227 Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted).
228 Id. at 342.
229 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
230 Id. at 651.
231 Id. at 654.
232 Id. at 652.
233 Id. at 656.
234 Suski, supra note 134, at 95 (“The Supreme Court did not [in Acton], and has not subsequently, addressed whether schools have any authority to search students outside the time
and space of the physical school setting or any limits thereof.”).
235 R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (D. Minn.
2012).
225
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School District,236 a twelve–year–old girl argued that her school violated the
Fourth Amendment when it disciplined her for out-of-school Facebook posts
she made, including one expressing her dislike of a school employee (her Facebook account was private, not public).237 The school officials even made the
girl “involuntarily surrender” her email and Facebook passwords to them when
they learned that she and another student “had an out-of-school sex-related
conversation” so that they could review more of her posts.238 Because the district court was only ruling on the school’s motion to dismiss, it accepted as true
the allegations the girl made for purposes of that review, and concluded that
they “amount[ed] to violations of [the girl’s] constitutional rights and that those
rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.”239
In so holding, the district court first examined whether the student had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook posts and direct messages.240
The court placed weight on the fact that although the student’s Facebook posts
were semi-public, in that they could be viewed by any of her Facebook friends,
her direct messages were private and accessible only to her, thus making them
more akin to email.241 Therefore, the court determined that she did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in at least some of the online material that the
school had accessed.242 The court cited to T.L.O., concluding that the school
officials had no reasonable grounds to believe that the search they conducted
would yield evidence that the student had violated school rules.243
Even in the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court or any appellate
courts, the holdings of T.L.O. and Acton offer some insight into how successful
such a challenge to online monitoring of students would be. Professor Emily
Suski has argued that schools’ surveillance of their students’ online activity
“actively fails” the two-prong test set out in T.L.O. for whether a search is reasonable.244 First, she argues that it fails the prong that the search be “justified at
236

Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1132–33.
238 Id. at 1133.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 1142.
241 Id. (“[A]t least some of the information and messages accessed by the school officials
were in R.S.’s exclusive possession, protected by her Facebook password. R.S. controlled
those items until she involuntarily relinquished her password. As with a private letter, the
content of R.S.’s electronic correspondence was available only to her and her correspondent.”).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1143 (“It is difficult for the Court to discern what, if any, legitimate interest the
school officials had for perusing R.S.’s private communications . . . . Moreover, the school
officials had no reason to believe that the search would return evidence of illegal behavior or
violations of school policy.”).
244 Suski, supra note 134, at 94. Professor Suski acknowledges that the online monitoring
may not be considered a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 96 (“Whether students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in many online and electronic communications is at best questionable. Frequently used online tools and services like Google make
237
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its inception” because “broad surveillance authority provided by the cyberbullying laws has no justification other than an undifferentiated understanding that
cyberbullying does happen sometimes among some students.”245 Second, she
argues that online monitoring is not reasonably related in scope to the justification of preventing cyberbullying because the scope of the monitoring is broad,
occurring twenty-four hours a day.246 To justify such a broad scope, “schools
would have to suspect that all students are engaged in cyberbullying at all
times.”247 However, Professor Suski also acknowledges that this argument is
not airtight and that schools would have a “decent argument” in support of the
surveillance under Acton.248 “While not as limited a search as the drug testing
in Acton, the argument exists that school surveillance does respond to a strong
need for school intervention and discipline in order to combat cyberbullying,
much like the searches in Acton.”249
Further support for the argument that online surveillance of students violates their protected expectation of privacy might be found in a seemingly unrelated Supreme Court opinion dealing with GPS tracking of cars. In United
States v. Jones, the police had placed a GPS tracker on the defendant’s car.250
The district court suppressed the data that had been gathered when the car was
parked at the defendant’s private residence but refused to exclude the other information gathered by that tracker, concluding that a person who is travelling
on public roads has no expectation of privacy in his or her movements.251 The
D.C. Circuit disagreed, and the Supreme Court likewise sided with the defendant.252 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the government’s argument that there was no Fourth Amendment violation here, as the data at issue
merely provided the car’s location on public roads, roads that “were visible to
all.”253 In rejecting that argument, Justice Scalia made clear that even though
the police could have lawfully surveilled the car without a warrant by traditional means such as having officers follow the car, the surveillance by GPS violat-

clear that users’ expectation of privacy in their searches and posts is limited.”). But see United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Whether the Fourth
Amendment precludes the Government from viewing a Facebook user’s profile absent a
showing of probable cause depends, inter alia, on the user’s privacy settings. When a social
media user disseminates his postings and information to the public, they are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment.”) (citations omitted); R.S., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (holding that
even if a user’s public Facebook wall is not private, their direct messages within the Facebook app are).
245 Suski, supra note 134, at 94.
246 Id. at 95.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 117.
249 Id.
250 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 404, 413.
253
Id. at 406.
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ed the Fourth Amendment.254 He further noted that the Court was unaware of
any cases that would support an argument that “what would otherwise be an
unconstitutional search is not such where it produces only public information.”255
Using the logic of the Jones holding, an advocate might be able to persuade
the Court that online surveillance of students by geofencing is akin to having a
warrantless GPS placed on their cars. Even though the students are posting on a
public website, they are like Jones when he drove on public roads. School officials can lawfully view their students’ posts through traditional surveillance,
just as the police in Jones could have tailed his car, but the added element of
using technology to conduct this surveillance turns it into an unlawful search.
Of course, the Jones majority relied on the fact that the police had touched the
undercarriage of the car while placing the GPS monitor, a physical intrusion
that is not present with purely online surveillance.256 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia did not foreclose the idea that electronic surveillance without a physical act
could still violate the Fourth Amendment.257 “It may be that achieving the same
result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to
answer that question.”258
One further point must be made in discussing potential Fourth Amendment violations. We live in the era of “surveillance capitalism,” described as “a
new economic order that claims human experience as a free source of raw material.”259 The online activity of any person is an extremely valuable commodity in this new world order, and third-party marketers and others are willing to
pay a premium to access it.260 Indeed, the online activities of schoolchildren are
an especially valuable commodity and children are a highly prized audience,
given that brand loyalty impressions created during youth can last for a lifetime.261 Thus, students’ interest in their privacy with respect to their online ac254

Id. at 412.
Id. at 409.
256
Id. at 410.
257 Id. at 412.
258 Id.
259 Jacob Silverman, How Tech Companies Manipulate Our Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/books/review/shoshana-zuboff-ageof-surveillance-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/HXH7-WG7U]; see also Shoshana Zuboff,
Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J.
INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015).
260 See Max Eddy, How Companies Turn Your Data Into Money, PCMAG (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.pcmag.com/article/364152/how-companies-turn-your-data-into-money [https
://perma.cc/B2K9-7BGK].
261 See Jennifer Comiteau, When Does Brand Loyalty Start?, ADWEEK (Mar. 24, 2003),
https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/when-does-brand-loyalty-start-62841 [https://
perma.cc/QAA7-Y59K] (noting that “American children become ‘brand-conscious’ at about
24 months, and by 36–42 months they make the connection that a brand can say something
about their personalities—they are strong or cool or smart.”).
255
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tivity is in some ways uniquely heightened, “as schools collecting sensitive information about their students may subsequently put this private data in the
hands of for-profit companies.”262 Khaliah Barnes, a lawyer at the Electronic
Privacy Information Center in Washington, says that “[s]tudents are currently
subject to more forms of tracking and monitoring than ever before,” and that
“there are too few safeguards for the amount of data collected and transmitted
from schools to private companies.”263 Updates made in 2013 to the Federal
Education Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) actually compounded this problem, rather than improving it, as the changes “permit schools to share student data,
without notifying parents, with companies to which they have outsourced core
functions like scheduling or data management.”264 Some state lawmakers are so
concerned about the possibility of schools selling student data that they have
passed laws prohibiting schools from selling or otherwise sharing certain data
about their students.265
Accordingly, students may have a successful Fourth Amendment claim arguing against online monitoring of them, especially if the schools are not being
careful about who can access the data that they are collecting and what they do
with it. But, as with a First Amendment argument, the Supreme Court is likely
to be sympathetic to a school’s proffered explanation that it is doing this monitoring to prevent school shootings or other forms of violence, and Acton opens
up leeway for schools to conduct such “suspicionless” searches.
D. Equal Protection
Students who are disciplined for their off-campus online activity may have
claims under the First and Fourth Amendment, as discussed above, and there
may even exist arguments for students who are not disciplined but are simply
subject to such online surveillance. For the narrower class of students of color
who are the victims of disproportioned punishment for their online expression,
they may also be able to challenge any discipline they receive under the Equal
262

Chandran, supra note 144, at 314.
Natasha Singer, Deciding Who Sees Students’ Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/deciding-who-sees-students-data.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/6CRJ-P5ZK].
264 Id.; see also Kevin Miller, Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime Technology: Privacy’s Perfect Storm, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 105, 112 (2014) (“Not only are the
companies providing learning data systems often not clear about with whom they share data,
parents are concerned about what will eventually come of behavioral data and other assessments—and whether that information will permanently limit their child’s future.”).
265 Chandran, supra note 144, at 314; see also Natasha Singer, With Tech Taking Over in
Schools,
Worries
Rise,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/technology/with-tech-taking-over-in-schools-worriesrise.html [https://perma.cc/UKS5-ZPXN] (noting that California passed a law “prohibiting
educational sites, apps and cloud services used by schools from selling or disclosing personal
information about students from kindergarten through high school; from using the children’s
data to market to them; and from compiling dossiers on them.”).
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Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons that follow,
though, such claims are unlikely to succeed.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits state actors from denying any person “the equal protection of the law.”266 If the challenged policy is “facially neutral but its application results in racially disproportionate outcomes,”267 courts will apply strict scrutiny when examining it.268
As is discussed above, there is already some evidence that there are racial disparities in the way that schools punish student online speech,269 which is consistent with other evidence surrounding national school discipline trends.270
“However, a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to [discipline for
online activity] will nonetheless be difficult to maintain as the Supreme Court
has consistently held that statistical evidence alone, absent discriminatory intent
or purpose, is not enough.”271
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court denied an equal protection
claim brought by black applicants to the police force in Washington, D.C.272
Because more blacks than whites failed the written test, and because the written
test was not shown to correlate with success as a police officer, the plaintiffs
challenged the test under the Equal Protection Clause.273 The Court rejected the
argument, noting that “our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”274 Although the Court conceded that a racially disproportionate
impact is “not irrelevant,” it nonetheless held that “[s]tanding alone, [racially
disproportionate impact] does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest
of considerations.”275
Courts that have applied Washington to school discipline cases where the
plaintiffs pointed out racially disproportionate impacts “have demanded more
than statistical evidence and have looked for evidence of racially discriminatory

266

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
Cyphert, supra note 98, at 916 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
268 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (citations omitted).
269 See, e.g., Jambulapati, supra note 91(explaining that in one Alabama school district,
twelve of the fourteen students who were expelled in a school year for the content of their
social media were African-American, despite the fact that African-American students made
up only 40 percent of the district).
270 See, e.g., Balingit, supra note 97 (in the 2015–2016 school year, according to federal data, “[b]lack students faced greater rates of suspension, expulsion and arrest than their white
classmates . . . disparities that have widened despite efforts to fix them.”).
271 Cyphert, supra note 98, at 916.
272 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
273 Id. at 235.
274 Id. at 239.
275
Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
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intent or animus.”276 A district court addressed the question directly in Fuller v.
Decatur Public School, where students who were expelled for fighting at a
football game challenged their expulsions under the Equal Protection Clause.277
Despite the fact that the school district acknowledged that African American
students made up 82% of the students who were expelled despite comprising
only 46–48% of the student body, the court rejected the students’ equal protection claim.278 Although the court recognized that such statistics “could lead a
reasonable person to speculate that the School Board’s expulsion action was
based upon the race of the students,” the court nonetheless held that it could not
“make its decision solely upon statistical speculation.”279 Rather, without any
evidence of actual racial animus on the part of the school officials, the claim
failed, as “the law is clear that a claim of racial discrimination and violation of
equal protection cannot be based upon mere statistics standing alone.”280
Other courts have joined Fuller and held that Washington requires more
than statistical evidence to sustain an equal protection claim on behalf of students of color who are disciplined by their schools.281 Accordingly, in the absence of any information suggesting that the policy or school officials specifically targeted students of color because of their race, it is unlikely that they
would have a successful equal protection claim if they are disciplined by their
schools for online expression.282
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Scholars have called upon the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to cases
involving school monitoring and regulation of student online speech in order to
provide clarity and consistency for the lower courts to follow.283 The Court
276

Cyphert, supra note 98, at 917.
Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 814, 823
(C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d sub nom., 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001).
278 Fuller, 78 F. Supp. at 824–25.
279 Id. at 824.
280 Id. at 825.
281 See Cyphert, supra note 98, at 917–18 (noting that “[o]ther courts have used this same
analysis in rejecting [e]qual [p]rotection claims brought by suspended or expelled students of
color, holding that ‘statistical proof that black students are disciplined more frequently and
more severely than white and Mexican-American students has limited probative value,’ ” and
concluding that “data alone would not be enough to establish an [e]qual [p]rotection claim
on behalf of students of color who were suspended or expelled from” their schools) (citation
omitted).
282 The Loomis decision, discussed above in Part I, is not probative of how a court might
handle an equal protection claim brought by a student challenging online monitoring because
in that case, the defendant made a due process challenge, not an equal protection one. State
v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 766 (Wisc. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290, (2017) (“Notably, however, Loomis does not bring an equal protection challenge in this case.”).
283 See, e.g., Mendola, supra note 79, at 182–87 (urging the Supreme Court to rule on these
cases and proposing the adoption of an adapted version of the Tinker substantial disruption
test).
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may decline to do so, or it may take the cases and then reject any legal arguments against online surveillance. This Article has attempted to predict what
the Court might ultimately do, but it seems increasingly likely that this kind of
surveillance will come to pass, and thus it is important to examine what best
practices might look like.
Of course, there are potential benefits to surveillance, and they are worth
noting. “By ensuring that students’ Internet usage does not substantially interfere with their peers’ learning, schools encourage the development of their students, who may worry less about Internet threats and more about their education.”284
A. Invest in High Quality High School Counselors
Contracting with a third party to conduct online surveillance on your students is not just legally murky and ethically complicated—it’s also expensive.285 Many contracts cost tens-of-thousands of dollars per year.286 Investing
that money instead into counselors is more likely to address the root causes of
violence in schools, whether that violence is self-harm or not.287 To the extent
schools are monitoring their students’ online accounts to flag students at risk of
death by suicide, a school counselor may be the only mental health professional
that students have access to. Counselors can also be instrumental in preventing
students from harming fellow students in episodes of school violence, as some
experts conclude that school shootings are the result of gaps in the provision of
mental health services.288 Further, unlike online surveillance, which has not
been proven effective, “[c]ounselors are well-tested: they have been standard in
most public schools since the late twentieth century and their presence has
proven to be effective in supporting and guiding students.”289 Counselors could
help educate students on proper cyber usage and address some of the underlying issues that impact cyberbullying. According to researchers, the relationships counselors form with their students are critical in preventing school vio284
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lence: “[c]onnecting with these students, listening to them and supporting them,
getting them the help they need . . . can help prevent future attacks and make
schools a safer place for all children.”290
B. Provide Students and Families with Transparency and Privacy Protections
Students and their families should not only be made aware that their school
is engaging in online surveillance, they should be given an opportunity to
meaningfully engage in conversations about the practice. Schools have had to
respond to concerns as they learn that parents are wary of third parties receiving data about their children without their consent.291 For example, the software
company inBloom, which had funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, once had contracts with nine
different states to store the data of more than eleven million students in a cloudbased system.292 But it shut down abruptly in 2014 after parent activists decried
the lack of privacy the company was providing to student data.293 Whether or
not inBloom was actually careless with student data, the fact that parents were
not given an opportunity to learn more about the services it provided was
enough to doom the company.294 State legislators are listening. In 2015, Delaware passed the Student Data Privacy Protection Act, which forbids third-party
software companies from selling student data or engaging in targeted advertising based on student data, and which defines student data to include, among
other things, a students’ geolocation data, instant messages, photos, and search
activity.295 Any school that is considering hiring a third party to monitor its students’ online activities should be transparent about who will be doing that monitoring, who will have access to the data that is collected, and should also host
information sessions to address questions or concerns from parents and students.
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C. Take a More Intentional and Multidisciplinary Approach to the Use of
Machine Learning
Predictive algorithms are here to stay. But that does not mean they cannot
be improved, and that we cannot learn early lessons from their deployment in
the criminal justice system and enact some best practices to help guide their use
in our school system. Indeed, scholars have already begun to outline important
technical ways that the stages of machine learning could be improved in terms
of guarding against bias, such as not using certain approaches where outputs
cannot be explained (such as convolutional neural networks).296
One non-technical best practice is for the teams who develop the kinds of
predictive algorithms addressed in this Article to be more multidisciplinary.
Rashida Richardson, director of policy research at New York University’s AI
Now Institute, which “studies the social implications of artificial intelligence,”
warns that:
[P]eople making these algorithms don’t necessarily understand all the social,
and even political, aspects of the data they’re using . . . . Researchers may not
understand a lot of the nuances of what people in the education and legal policy
world call school climate. That includes safety and behavioral issues . . . . The
kind of school you’re in will often dictate how behavior is dealt with and how
discipline is handled.297

Others echo Richardson’s concern about a lack of a multidisciplinary approach. “As machine learning has expanded beyond its roots in the worlds of
computer science and statistics into nearly every conceivable field, the data scientists and programmers building those models are increasingly detached from
an understanding of how and why the models they are creating work.”298
Schools should ask questions about the team that developed the algorithm before they enter into a contract with a company. Was it multi-disciplinary? Did
they consult with education experts? Legal experts? These are important questions with serious consequences.
CONCLUSION
In the end, as technology places ever more powerful tools in the hands of those
without an understanding of how they work, we are creating great business and
societal risk if we don’t find ways of building interfaces to these models such
296
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that they are able to communicate these distinctions and issues like data bias to
their growing user community that lacks an awareness of those concerns.299

School students are an especially vulnerable population. As schools work
toward the essential goal of protecting students, they must be careful to respect
their legal rights and their privacy. Machine learning technology is still so new
and is rapidly evolving. But lessons can and should be learned from its use in
the criminal justice system. If we truly want to keep our children safe, both
from violence and from bias, we must tread carefully and deliberately.
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